The crisis does not distinguish species
July 13, 2022
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A frequent question among citizens, especially en
in authoritarian contexts, it is who can defend them against the systematic violation of their rights and why organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States "seem" to do nothing in the face of serious violations of Human Rights (DDHH). In this sense, these lines are presented as an approach to the functioning of these organizations, their powers in the protection of human rights in order to have expectations much closer to reality and to make a special call on the Universal Periodic Review.
What are Human Rights Protection Systems?
In general terms, these systems are understood as the set of bodies and instruments responsible for the promotion and protection of Human Rights at the national, regional and universal levels. It is in these last two areas that we find the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights as part of the United Nations and the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights as part of the Organization of American States.
However, these protection systems find constant limitations, among them, state sovereignty and the lack of will of the States to comply with their commitments, since one of the distinctive features of these systems is that they are complementary to state institutions, therefore, they cannot directly replace the functions of the State. It should be noted that this will does not exempt them from being responsible in case of violation of their international commitments, but direct intervention in the territories is not conceived and another of the main weaknesses of the systems is the lack of mechanisms that can subdue the States . Until now, the controversial Responsibility to Protect continues to be debated as a more effective way to overcome these limitations and help the population in serious cases. However, some countries claim that this is a way of masking the intervention.
How do the Human Rights Protection Systems work?
Although it is not an easy task to think about the effectiveness of these structures, democratic contexts certainly favor the commitment of States. The greatest difficulty occurs in authoritarian contexts, considering that protection systems are thought of as complementary institutions to the functionality of the State and are part of the commitment of national institutions. These bodies start from the assumption that the States do indeed intend to advance in the promotion and protection of Human Rights and that in those cases in which a violation may occur, they are willing and have the instruments to recognize and repair the victims.
In addition to this, most of these protection mechanisms previously require the acceptance of their competence by the State. This is precisely one of the great difficulties in the case of Cuba, even more so when internationally many States have not yet established a clear position regarding the type of regime and what are the actions that should be taken in the face of the violation not only of the democratic institutions of the State of law but of the systematic and massive violation of Human Rights.
What can we do in authoritarian contexts?
Despite the aforementioned limitations, there are very important mechanisms to make contexts such as Cuba visible, being an advantage that some do not require additional ratifications for their operation and pronouncement on the situation of the State, it is only required to be a member of the System of United Nations. Such is the case of the Human Rights Council, which although it is a body highly criticized for being a government entity where, within its 47 members, we frequently find non-democratic States, it is an essential space for making crises visible.
This body, together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Conventional Bodies and the Special Procedures, make up the Universal Human Rights System. Having the majority of these bodies (except conventional bodies) the competence to act without the ratification of any other additional instrument beyond the United Nations charter.
Although certain spheres of the Universal System have been monopolized by the Cuban regime, making use of official civil society organizations to bring their reports and invalidate any dissident voice. It is necessary, knowing the limitations of their powers, to retake these spaces. Thus, the next Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that Cuba will take in 2023 in the 44th cycle (October - November) is presented as a great opportunity. In this sense, the call is made to independent civil society organizations, from diversity and plurality, to deliver contributions that contrast with the reality that the regime in power wants to sell and thereby demonstrate the lack of commitment to the 2018 UPR results and recommendations.
What is it and what to expect from the Universal Periodic Review?
For the development of its activities, the Human Rights Council, in addition to having the power to designate investigative missions and field visits, has four subsidiary bodies: the Special Procedures, the Advisory Committee, the Complaint Procedure and the Mechanism of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). It is about the latter that they want to make a special appeal.
Currently there is no other universal mechanism of the same nature as the Universal Periodic Review. This is a process that is presented as a way to examine in depth, every 4.5 years, the human rights situation in all the countries that make up the United Nations and compliance with instruments such as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the human rights instruments to which the State is a party, the commitments assumed by the State and applicable international humanitarian law.
This examination is based on three sources: first, the information provided by the State generally known as the “national report”; the second, the information contained in the reports of the Special Procedures, human rights treaty bodies and other UN entities; and third, information from other interested parties, including non-governmental organizations.
After several stages of the examination, in a plenary session of the Working Group, the final document on the result of said examination and the position of the State regarding the recommendations made is adopted. In this adoption, the following participate: the State under review, the other States and other interested actors that include national Human Rights institutions and NGO representatives. All States have the responsibility to implement the agreed recommendations in the final outcome and in those cases in which the State does not cooperate, the Human Rights Council may decide the measures that can be taken.
In view of the above, although it is clear that this does not produce structural changes immediately, this is an important measure of pressure and visibility. For this reason, it is necessary that, in the case of Cuba, independent civil society organizations participate in a coordinated and massive manner, having clear expectations regarding the Council's capacity for action. Perhaps the most important thing in the next UPR is to demonstrate that the pro-government voice that the regime has managed to position as the truth is nothing more than a distorted reality and that it seeks to exempt Cuba from responsibility.
Invisibilización y falta de políticas regionales
El tratamiento que los migrantes cubanos reciben en Colombia y en la región es sumamente preocupante, los cubanos han sido invisibilizados por completo en el debate público. En muchos casos, optan por pasar desapercibidos, temiendo ser deportados o devueltos a un régimen que los condena por el simple hecho de intentar salir del país.
La falta de una política migratoria diferenciada para los cubanos es una falla significativa en la aplicación de instrumentos de protección internacional, como la Declaración de Cartagena de 1984. Este documento, que ha sido clave en la ampliación de los derechos de los refugiados en América Latina, va más allá de la definición tradicional de refugiado contenida en la Convención de 1951 y su Protocolo de 1967. La Declaración de Cartagena incluye en su definición a las personas que huyen no solo de persecución por motivos políticos, religiosos o raciales, sino también de “violencia generalizada, agresión extranjera, conflictos internos, violaciones masivas de derechos humanos u otras circunstancias que hayan perturbado gravemente el orden público.”
Este marco debería ser aplicable a los migrantes cubanos que huyen de una situación de represión, persecución política y violaciones sistemáticas de derechos humanos, agravadas por las condiciones de extrema escasez y hambre. Sin embargo, en la práctica, las políticas migratorias de los países de la región—incluida Colombia—no han considerado las particularidades de la migración cubana, y por el contrario actúan desde el interés político con el régimen. Esto es particularmente grave en un contexto en el que incluso los venezolanos, con su abrumadora crisis de desplazamiento, han enfrentado dificultades para ser reconocidos plenamente como refugiados bajo la Declaración de Cartagena.
Para quienes llegan a Colombia no hay mayores opciones que las vías de regularización ordinaria, las cuales son muy costosas tanto en recursos como en tiempo. Por ejemplo, en el caso de aquellas personas que quieran solicitar y ser reconocidas como refugiadas, el tiempo de respondía puede extenderse hasta por cuatro años, tiempo durante el cual no pueden trabajar y por tanto no tienen como sobrevivir en un país en donde no cuentan con redes de apoyo.
¿Dónde está la solidaridad regional?
La falta de una respuesta regional coherente y solidaria ante la crisis cubana no es solo un problema humanitario; es también una contradicción a los principios sobre los cuales América Latina ha construido su compromiso con los derechos humanos. Esto no solo pone en riesgo a miles de migrantes, sino que también socava la credibilidad de la región como defensora de los derechos humanos y promotora de soluciones solidarias.
América Latina enfrenta una paradoja: mientras promueve el respeto a los derechos humanos y la solidaridad entre naciones, cierra los ojos ante las tragedias que sufren sus vecinos. El caso cubano es emblemático de esta contradicción. La invisibilización de la migración cubana no solo es una violación de los principios básicos de protección internacional, sino que también perpetúa la narrativa de que en Cuba no hay una crisis, favoreciendo a un régimen que sigue oprimiendo a su pueblo.
Colombia, como país signatario de la Declaración de Cartagena, debería tomar la delantera en reconocer la situación de los cubanos que llegan a su territorio. Es necesario que el país adopte políticas diferenciadas que reconozcan las condiciones de vulnerabilidad de los cubanos y que los protejan, no solo como migrantes, sino como personas que huyen de un régimen opresivo. Si bien se ha avanzado con la población venezolana.
La atención a la migración cubana es una deuda de solidaridad que la región aún no ha saldado. La región debe actuar con urgencia y responsabilidad, y demostrar que la protección de los derechos humanos no es una cuestión de números, sino de principios. Actuar de manera coordinada con un enfoque de derecho humanos y centrado en la dignidad de las personas y no de las afinidades políticas.